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In the Suprellle Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
RUTH ELIZABETH HOLT CRAVEN, \ 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
- vs -
KENNETH D. CRAVEN, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 7446 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County ,Honorable William Stanley Dunford, Judge. 
This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah, In and For Utah County, and 
from the judgment entered on the 2 I st of September, 
1949, and from the judgment of said District Court' Judge, 
the Honorable William Stanley Dunford, in denying the 
appellant's motion for a new trial. 
The Appellant will be referred to as defendant and 
the Respondent will be referred to as the plaintiff. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, Kenneth D. Craven, is a marr'ied man re-
siding in Provo, Utah. 
Plaintiff, the former wife of defendant, together with 
Robert Holt Craven, a minor son of plaintiff and defend-
ant, resides in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
On or about the I Oth day of June, 1949, the plain-
tiff caused to be filed 'in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court a petition entitled "Motion for Order to Show 
Cause" which, omitting the formal portions thereof and 
the prayer, reads as follows: 
I. That on the 16th day of April, 1945, the Court 
made and entered its decree in the above entitled 
action wherein plaintiff was granted a divorce from 
the defendant and was likewise given the care, cus-
tody and control of the minor child, Robert Holt 
Craven, and whereby the defendant was ordered to 
pay for the care, maintenance and support of said 
child the sum of $25.00 per month, to commence on 
the I st day of May, 1945. 
2. That at the same time the above-entitled de-
cree was issued the aforesaid minor child was an in-
fant of the age of fifteen months, and that at the 
present time the minor child is of the age of 5 years 
and 4 months. 
3. That this plaintiff has no funds with which to sup-
port the said infant at this time and is wholly de-
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3 
pendent upon the moneys paid by the defendant for 
. the support of said infant. 
4. That the said defendant is an architect with a 
place of business at Provo, Utah, is gainfully em-
ployed, and the owner and in possession of various 
real property, automobiles, cash and other personal 
property, the exact value and location of which is 
unknown to the plaintiff, but which is known to the 
defendant herein. 
5. That since the aforesaid decree of divorce was 
issued, the child of the parties has grown from in-
fancy to the age of five years and four months, with 
the resuli that he requires much more food, clothing 
and medical care; furthermore, that since the date 
of the aforesaid decree there has been a great in-
crease in the price of ·food, clothing, housing ac-
comodations and all other items which are necessary 
for the proper care and support of said infant. 
6. That in consequence thereof, the $25.00 a month 
paid by the defendant to the plaintiff for the sup-
port of said m·inor child is no longer adequate for 
the support of said minor child, but that the plaintiff 
herein is required to expend the sum of $50.00 per 
month for the support of said child; that said sum is 
necessary for the proper support, nutrition and care 
of said child. 
· 7. That the plaintiff herein has found it necessary 
to engage the services of an attorney to petition 
this Court to modify the original decree herein; that 
the plaintiff herein is entitled to reimbursement by 
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the defendant for the attorney fee incurred herein; 
that the plaintiff is obligated to her attorney for a 
reasonable attorney fee for his services herein. 
The matter came on to be heard before the court 
on the 27th day of August, 1949. The defendant was 
present and was represented by counsel, but filed no 
formal pleadings. However, counsel for the defendant, 
at the opening of plaintiff's evidence, demurred to the 
plaintiff's petition on the ground that the petition did 
not allege facts sufficient to warrant a modification of the 
decree (TR-3). The court overruled defendant's demur-
rer (TR-7). 
At the conclusion of the hearing the defendant 
moved the court to dism.iss the petition on the ground and 
for the reason that the evidence adduced by the plain-
tiff did not prove facts sufficient to warrant a modifica-
tion of the original decree. Said motion was denied by 
the court. 
Thereafter on the 21st day of September, 1949, the 
court made and entered its Finding of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order of Modification which, omitting the 
formal parts, are as follows: 
FINDING OF FACT 
I. That on the 16th day of April, 1945, the court 
made and entered its decree in the above-entitled 
action wherein plaintiff was granted a divorce from 
the defendant, was likewise given the care, custody 
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and control of the minor child, Robert Holt Craven, 
and whereby the defendant was ordered to pay for 
the care, maintenance and support of said child the 
sum of $25.00 per month, to commence on the I st 
day of May, 1945. 
2. That at the time the above-mentioned decree 
was issued the aforesaid minor child was an infant of 
the age of fifteen months, and that at the present 
time the minor child is of the age of 5years and 8 
months. 
3. That this plaintiff has no funds with which to 
support the said infant at this time and is wholly de-
pendant upon the moneys paid by the defendant for 
the support of the said 'infant. 
4. That the conditions under which the court based 
its original decree and the amount of payment of 
money for the support of the said minor child have 
changed in the following particulars: 
A. The defendant is now employed as an 
estimator and draftsman in architectural work and is 
earning a substantial income. 
B. The minor child of the parties is now five 
years and eight months old and is about to enter 
school; and 
C. The necessities of the child for clothing, 
food, education and care have materially increased 
in cost, due both to the growth of the child and to 
a general increase of prices of such items. 
5. That there is needed for the care and support of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
the child at present the sum of $35.00 per month 
until the child actually enters school and $50.00 per 
month after the said child enters school. 
6. That the plaintiff herein has found it necessary 
to engage the services of an attorney to petition this 
court to modify the original decree herein; that the 
plaintiff herein is entitled to reimbursement by the 
defendant for the attorney fee incurred herein; that 
a reasonable fee for the hearings had herein and 
services performed in connection herewith is $100.00: 
that plaintiff is obligated to her attorney in the 
amount of $1 00.00 for the services herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As conclusions of law from the foregoing findings of 
fact, the court concludes: 
I. That the plaintiff is entitled to an order of this 
court modifying the original decree herein so as to 
provide that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 
as support money for the minor child of the parties 
the sum of $35.00 per month until such time as the 
said child enters school and $50.00 per month there-
after and until further order of this court. 
2. That the plaintiff 'is entitled to an order of this 
court directing the defendant to pay to her the sum 
of $100.00 for attorney's fees in this action. 
3. That the plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed by 
the defendant for her costs in this action. 
ORDER OF MODIFICATION 
NOW, THEREFORE by reason of the Findings of 
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Fact and Conclusions of law aforesaid, it is hereby 
ordered, adjudged and decreed: 
I. That the original decree herein be modified so 
as to provide that the defendant be ordered to pay, 
and is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff for the 
support of the minor child of the parties the sum of 
$35.00 per month until such times as the said child 
enters school. and thereupon and thereafter the sum 
of $50.00 per month until the further order of this 
court. 
2. The defendant is hereby ordered to the pay the 
plaintiff the sum of $100.00 for her attorney's fees 
in this action and her costs in this action in the 
amount of $2 1.1 0; and that furthermore the said 
costs and attorney's fees shall be paid within 30 days 
from the date of the service upon the defendant of 
this order. 
On or about the 21st day of September, 1949, the 
defendant filed his Notice of Motion for New Trial 
(JR-37). The Motion for new trial was heard by the Hon-
orable William Stanley Dunford and on the 27th day of 
October, 1949, the court denied the mofion (JR-44). 
Thereafter defendant filed and served his Notice of 
Appeal (JR-.57), and perfected his appeal to the court. 
The evidence adduced at the hear'ing shows that on 
or about the 16th day of April. 1945, the plaintiff was 
granted a divorce from the defendant and she was award-
ed the care, custody and control of Robert Holt Craven, 
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m1nor son of the plaintiff and the defendant, and that 
the defendant was orderd to pay the plaintiff, for the sup-
port and maintenance of said child the sum of $25.00 
per month (JR-13). 
At the time of the divorce the defendant was an in-
dependent contractor working out of his own home 
(TR-28) and at the time of hearing of the Petition for Mod-
ification there had been no change in that respect (TR-29}. 
When the divorce decree was entered the defendant 
owned a home, and at the time of the hearing of the 
Petition for Modification he owned the same property. 
That was +he real property which was referred to in plain-
tiff's petition (TR-29) and there is no evidence that he 
owns any other real property. At the time of the di-
vorce the defendant owned an automobile, and at the 
time of the Petition for Modification the defendant like-
wise had an automobile. (TR-81} At the time of the di-
vorce the defendant was earning between $250.00 and 
$300.00 per month and was banking the same in a check-
ing account (TR-29), whereas, the evidence adduced ·at 
the hearing on plaintiff's petition was that the defendant 
had grossed approximately $1,700.00 from the first of 
the calendar year 1949 down to the date of the hearing 
of the Petition for Modification (TR-78). At the time of 
the hearing the defendant had $78.07 on deposit in a 
checking account and $144.27 in a savings account 
(TR-1 0). The defendant did not own any property in 
1949 that he did not own in 1945 except that he had 
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9 
traded cars and was obligated to pay $66.00 per month 
on his new car (TR-81 ). 
The defendant is frequently unemployed now and 
the situation with respect to his employment is similar to 
that of 1945, when the divorce was obtained (TR-87). 
Robert Holt Craven, the minor son of the plaintiff and de-
fendant, was fifteen months otd at the time the divorce 
decree was entered and was five and one-half years old 
at the time of the hearing of the Petition for Modification 
(TR-14). The child wasn't of school age and w·asn't in 
school at the time of the hearing and is not in school at 
the present time. 
I. 
Witness Mrs. Craven did not have an independent 
recollection of the 'items of food and clothing that might 
have been purchased for the child in 1945 (TR-1 8). She 
wquld not say that it did not cost $50.00 per month to 
l. 
n;9intain the child in 1945 (TR-32). The plaintiff had been 
p~yi!lg $30.00 per month for the child's food and shelter 
since the divorce decree was entered and she anticipated 
that the same arrangement would continue in the future 
(TR-21 ). The plaintiff is employed and makes $208.00 
per month (TR-36), and the plaintiff has been able to save 
$60.00 per month from her earnings (TR-37). 
Witness Rex Taylor testified that in his opinion 
clothing costs had increased somewhere between 20 per 
cent and 30 per cent from 1945 to 1949 (TR-44). The wit-
ness could not give any evidence as to the difference in 
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the cost of clothing for a fifteen month old boy in 1945 
and the cost of clothing for a boy five years old in 1949. 
(TR-52). 
Witness Kenneth L. Pace testified that in his opinion 
foods generally were 20 per cent higher in 1949 than in 
1945 (TR-65). The witness's testimony was based on OPA 
price ceiling schedule which became effective as of 
March I, 1946, (TR-60). 
The defendant had at all times made all payments 
required of him under the original decree and at the time 
of the petition for Modification was entirely current on 
all payments due for the support and maintenance of the 
minor child growing out of the original decree of divorce. 
POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL 
J. Plaintiff's petition for modification did not con-
tain facts suffici~nt to show a mater'ial change in circum-
stances warranting a modification of the decree and the 
defendant's timely objection thereto was erroneously over-
ruled by the trial court. 
2. The evidence and proof adduced at the hearing 
was insufficient to warrant a modification of the decree 
and the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion 
to dismiss the petition. 
3. Finding of Fact numbered 3, to the effect that 
plaintiff was entirely dependent upon defendant for the 
support of the minor. child is without any factual basis· 
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· whatever and is clearly contrary to the evidence. 
:r 
:e. 
.. 
4. Finding· of Fact numbered 4 (A) which states 
that defendant was earning a substantial mcome is not 
supported by any substantial evidence. 
5. The court erred in granting plaintiff a special 
award to cover educational costs for the minor child. 
6. Finding of Fact numbered 4 (C) insofar as it im-
plies an increased burden on the part of the plaintiff by 
reason of increases in the cost of food, education and care 
is without any substantial evidence and is contrary to the 
evidence. 
7. Finding of Fact numbered 5 is not supported 
by the evidence and is a Conclusion of Law. 
8. The court erred in granting plaintiff judgment 
against the defendant for the sum of $1 00.00 for her 
attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
The court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer to 
the plaintiff's petition. 
It is well settled in Utah that the power of the court 
to modify a prior decree is limited to cases where a ma-
terial change of conditions has occurred, Hamilton v. 
Hamilton, 58 P {2) I I; Chaffee v. Chaffee, 225 P 76; Car-
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son v. Carson, 47 P (2) 894; and that a modification may 
be had only upon allegation and proof of such material 
change. Doe v. Doe, 158 P. 781; Gardner v. Gardner, 
177 P (2) 743. An order modifying a decree will be re-
versed where the petition does not sufficiently allege a 
material change of conditions. Jones v. Jones, 139 P 
(2) 222. 
Plaintiff's petition shows nothing more by way of 
changed condii·ions than that the minor child has aged 
from 15 months to 5 years and four months and that there 
has been some increase in the cost of food and clothing. 
Such allegations, standing alone, lack the sign"ificance and 
materiality essential to the modification of an existing 
decree. That a child of tender years will grow and age 
and prices will fluctuate are factors of which the court 
must have been cognizant when the or'iginal decree was 
entered. 
The allowance of plaintiff's petition on such a slight 
and insignificant basis would set a precedent likely to de-
prive original decrees of all semblence of stability and 
force. See, Rockwood v. Rockwood (Utah) 236 Pac. 457, 
and Snyder v. Snyder, (Cal.) 25 P (2) 403. 
II 
The court erred in failing and refusing to grant the 
defendant's motion for a dismissal of the petition on the 
ground that the evidence and proof was insuffient to war-
rant a modification of the decree. 
I 
,II 
' ~! 
00 
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Defendant, of course, concedes that the allegations 
contained in paragraph I and 2 of the plaintiff's petition 
are true. 
The allegation in paragraph 3 that the plaintiff had 
no funds with which to support the child and was wholly 
dependent upon the moneys paid by the defendant not 
only was not supported by any evidence whatsoever, but 
was contrary to the plaintiff's own testimony. Pla'intiff 
testified that she was employed; that she was earn.ing 
$208.00 per month, and that she made a practice of 
saving $60.00 per month (TR-36-37). 
With respect to the allegations contained in para-
graph 4 of plaintiff's petition the evidence shows that the 
defendant was not an architect but was an estimator and 
draftsman working out of his own home on an independ-
ent contractor basis (TR-28), and that there had been no 
change in that respect (TR-29). The evidence further 
shows that at the time of the divorce the defendant us-
ually earned between $250.00 and $300.00 per month 
(TR-29). From the first of the calendar year 1949, down 
7o the time of the hearing of the petition for modifica-
tion the defendant had earned only about $I, 700.00, 
(TR-78) an average of about $212.50 per month. At the 
time of the hearing the defendant had only $78.07 in his 
checking account and $144.27 in a savings account. 
(TR-1 0). The defendant did not have enough work to 
keep him busy (TR-78). He was frequently unemployed 
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and the situation with respect to employment was similar 
to what it had been in 1945, when the divorce was ob-
tained (TR-87). 
The defendant owned no real property in 1949 that 
he had not owned in 1945, at the time of the divorce. 
The ''various'' real property mentioned by the plaintiff in 
her petition referred only to defendant's home (TR-29) 
which he had also owned at the time of the divorce. At 
the time of the divorce the defendant had owned an auto-
mobil (TR-29). At the time of this hearing he had ac-
quired a different automobile, but had obligated himself 
to a payment of $66.00 per month to pay for the same. I , 
(TR-81). 
Defendant submits that the plaintiff's petition failed 
to allege any change in the defendant's financial circum-
ctances and that plaintiff's evidence with respect thereto 
not only failed to establish a change for the better. but 
actually indicated that the defendant was, at the time of 
the hearing, in a worse financial condition than when the 
divorce was granted. 
Insofar as the allegations in paragraph 5 of plain-
tiff's petition are concerned, the evidence indicates that 
ever since the granting of the divorce decree in 1945, 
the plaintiff and the child had resided in Salt Lake City 
with plaintiff's parents, and plaintiff had been, and was 
at the time of the hearing, paying her mother $30.00 per 
month for the care, food and shelter for the child. Plain-
' I
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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tiff anticipated that the same cost would continue in the 
future. (TR-21) In view of that arrangement the evi-
dence with respect to the increase in food prices was im-
material and defendant's objection thereto on that ground 
. should have been sustained. 
The most that could be said for plaintiff's proof is 
that there is some evidence that the general cost of cloth-
ing had increased somewhere between 20 per cent and 30 
per cent from 1945 to 1949. Witness, Rex Taylor, how-
ever, could not correlate the difference in the cost of 
clothing for a 15 month old child in 1945, as against the 
cost of clothing for a 5 year old in 1949. Furthermore, if 
it is true that clothing and food costs have generally 'in-
creased, it must be asumed that the increase has affected 
the defendant also. If he made substantially the same 
money at the time of the hearing of the petition as he did 
at the time of the divorce, his economic situation is ad-
versely affected by increased prices. 
Paragraph 6 of the petition is a mere conclusion. 
Ill 
The court erred in making and entering its Finding of 
fact numbered 3, which reads as follows: 
"That this plaintiff has no funds with which to sup-
port said infant at this time and is wholly depend-
ent upon the moneys paid by defendant for the 
support of said infant." 
The only evidence relating to this assignment ot error 
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is, that of the plaintiff herself. Plaintiff stated that she 
was employed and that she was earning $208.00 per 
month and that she made it a practice of saving $60.00 
each month (TR-37). Defendant finds nothing whatsoever 
to the contrary in the transcript. 
IV 
The court erred in making and entering its Finding 
of Fact numbered 4 (A) which reads as follows: 
"The defendant is now employed as an estimator 
and draftsman in architectural work and is earning 
a substant'ial income." 
It is clear that the defendant is not an "employee" in 
the usually accepted sense of the wor·d. He is, and at all 
times herein material has been, an independent contractor 
functioning out of his own home (TR-28-29). He did not 
have enough business to keep him busy (TR-78). He is 
often without any work to do. The situation in the re-
spect is similar to what it was in 1945 (TR-87). 
The evidence shows that the defendant has remar-
ried and that his gross income for the year 1949, down to 
the time of the hearing, was only about $1 ,700.00. Mak-
ing no allowance whatever for his ordinary and necessary 
business expenses, he grossed only about $212.50 on a 
monthly average. He had entered into another mar-
riage and had incurred an obligation on an automobile 
to the extent of $66.00 per month. Those obligations, 
coupled with the $25.00 per month due under the original 
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decree, certainly left the defendant m short financial 
circumstances to say the least. 
There is no evidence whatever that the defendant 
was "employed" or that he had a job of work to do at 
the time of the hearing. No inquiry concerning his status 
at that time was directed to him or to any other witness 
at the hearing. 
v 
The court erred in granting the plaintiff a special in-
crease to cover educational costs for the m·inor child. 
Plaintiff's petition makes no mention whatever re-
specting the education of the child. The child was only 
five years old and was not of school age. There is no 
evidence whatever in the record of this case to indicate 
that spec'ial educational costs wi!l be incurred or that if 
and when the child becomes of school age it would be 
necessary for it to attend other than a free public school. 
The pleading will not support the order of the trial court. 
Jones v. Jones (Utah} 139 P (2} 222. 
VI 
The court erred in finding that the cost of providing 
food, education and care of the min-or child has placed 
an increased burden on the plaintiff. 
As has hereinbefore been pointed out, the plaintiff 
testified that since the granting of the original decree she 
had continuously paid her mother $30.00 per month for 
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food, lodging and care of the child. She antic.ipated 
that such arrangement would continue in the future 
{TR-2 I). I im 
That the price of groceries may have increased from 
1945 to 1949, became an immaterial factor in this 
case. Plaintiff for a number of years had expended 
$30.00 per month to secure these items for the child. 
That arrangement was operative at the time of the hear-
ing and so far as the plaintiff could foresee would con-
tinue indefinitely. 
VII 
The court erred in ordering the defendant to in-
crease his payments for the support of the minor child. 
The defendant respectfully submits that the needs 
of the child (assuming that the need has been shown) is 
certainly not the sole criteria for the granting of an in-
crease in the monthly allowance. Of necessity, the ability 
of the father to pay ·is o,ne of the dominating factors. 
The evidence indicates that the defendant was gros-
sing about $212.50 per month. He was ·in business for 
himself and although the record does not disclose the ex-
tent of his business expenses, it would have to be assumed 
that his earnings were not all profit. He had rem9rried 
:md had thus assumed an additional burden. He had obli-
gated himself to the extent of $66.00 per month for the 
purchase of a car. This latter obligation coupled with his 
I !I 
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expense of $25.00 per month for the support of the child 
under the original decree, would leave him only approx-
imately $121.50 per month for his business and living 
expenses. 
Although the father owes the primary duty to sup· 
port the child, the mother likewise has a responsibility. 
Where as in the instant case the mother's earning capac-
ity substantially equals that of the father and the re-
quirements of the child are beyond the reasonable means 
of the father owing to his limited earning abil"ity and to 
other prior obligations incurred by him, the mother should 
be expected to contribute to the support of the child. In 
such case the trial court is not justified in placing the en-
tire responsibility upon an overburdened father. Cf: 
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Woolf in Holbrook 
v. Holbrook. No. 7296. 
VIII 
The court erred in granting plaintiff judgment 
against defendant for the sum of $100.00 for her attorney. 
It is conceded by the parties that at the time of the 
hearing the defendant had made all payments required of 
him by the original decree and was not in default there-
under in any manner whatsoever. 
Where a defendant is not in default under the orig-
inal decree, and the decree has become final so that his 
former spouse is no longer his wife within the meaning of 
the statute, attorney's fees are not allowable even though 
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it may be said that the action is for the benefit of a minor 
child. Barish v. Barish, 180 N.W. 724, an Iowa case in- . !' 
volving a statute indentical to that of Utah. Also see, 
Duvall v. Duvall, 244 N.W. 718; Dolby v. Dolby, (Wash.) 
160 P. 950: Hector v. Hector, (Wash.), 99 P. 13; Hayton 
v. Hayton 21 I P. 745. 
Defendant concedes that there are numerous Utah 
cases involving a defendant in default where attorney's 
fees have been allowed. A number of such cases are 
referre'd to in the Honorable Trial Judge's memorandum 
decision on motion for new trial. In all of those cases the 
actions being tried grew out of the original decree and 
were designed to either preserve or enforce the original 
decree. Counsel for defendant could not find any Utah 
case allowing attorney's fees against a defendant who was 
not in default under the original decree. 
The Honorable Trial Judge's rationale is based on the 
equities as he saw them. But, the allowance of attorney's 
fees is statutory and such fees may be granted only as 
provided by law. There are many situations where the 
allowance of. attorney's fees would apparently be ~quit­
able, but the court is without authority to grant them. 
Here the plaintiff is no longer the wife of the defendant. 
This suit did not grow out of the original decree, but by 
its very nature must be predicated upon changed con-
ditions arising since that time. Furthermore, as far as the 
equities are concerned the facts here would support a 
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finding that the plaintiff was better able financially to 
bear her attorney's fee than was the defendant. 
The very nature of a situation such as the one at 
hand impels a defendant to resist the petition for modifi-
cation, if for no other reason than to ward off a judgment 
against him for attorney's fees. He is not in default but 
has complied in all respects with the order of the court. 
Yet, without warning and without opportunity to voluntar-
ily increase his payments, under the holding of the instant 
case, a defendant may find himself under judgment for 
attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the court should reverse 
the trial court's decision in the above entitled cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH & BULLOCK, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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